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NOTES
SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT IN PRISONS
AND THE SELF-INCRIMINATION
PRIVILEGE:
HOW SHOULD COURTS APPROACH
OBLIGATORY, UN-IMMUNIZED




No person . .. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.'
In early 2006, a prisoner in the New York State Department
of Correctional Services ("DOCS") named Joseph Hirsch
transferred to the Oneida Correctional Facility in Rome, New
York.2 In 2002, Joseph had been convicted on counts of sexual
abuse in the first and second degrees and unlawful
imprisonment; and, as his sentence neared its close, he was to
participate in DOCS's Sex Offender Counseling Program
t Articles Editor, St. John's Law Review and Journal of Catholic Legal Studies;
JD. Candidate, 2012, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Sarah
Lawrence College. I wish to thank my mother and father, Carolyn and Raymond;
sister, Gail; brother, Raymond; sister-in-law, Katherine; grandmother, Regina
Donahue; my best friends Colin, Keegan, Lia, and Piper; and the remainder of my
friends and family for their overwhelming, unconditional, and undeserved support
throughout my three years in law school. I could not have made this journey without
their gracious and freely given love. Likewise, I thank God for his gracious and
freely given sacrifice, in the Person of 'Ihcou; Xptor6q, for every day I awake living
and breathing.
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
2 See Amended Complaint at 4, 35, Hirsch v. Desmond, No. 08-CV-2660
(JS)(AKT), 2010 WL 3937303 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Amended
Complaint] (on file with author); see also N.Y. STATE DEP'T CORR. SERVS., Facility
Listing, http://www.doccs.ny.gov/faclist.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
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("SOCP").3 Upon admission to SOCP, Joseph signed a waiver
that acknowledged, "I .. . understand that any crime of detail I
disclose [that] ... I have previously committed and not been
prosecuted for ... will be reported to the appropriate law
enforcement agencies."'
In addition to signing this waiver, Joseph had to accept
responsibility for his past misconduct by admitting to his offenses
of conviction and other allegations contained in his probation
report.' This report contained an allegation of penetration, for
which Hirsch had been acquitted, and an allegation of stalking,
for which he had never been charged.6 Joseph feared, therefore,
that in light of the waiver he had signed, admitting to the
stalking conduct would expose him to further prosecution.'
Moreover, he feared that admitting to the penetration allegation
and his offenses of conviction might, in the event his convictions
were overturned, be used against him in any re-trial the state
might pursue.' In light of these fears, Joseph refused to make
the required admissions and he became ineligible to participate
in SOCP.9  Despite Joseph's protests that the admission
requirements violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, 0  the Time Allowance Committee
recommended that all of Joseph's good-time credit be withheld,
leading to his spending an additional ten-and-a-half months
behind bars-that is, completing his full sentence." Situations
similar to Joseph's have become increasingly common in
America.
3 See Amended Complaint, supra note 2; Hirsch v. Plescia, No. 03-CV-
1617(DLI), 2005 WL 2038587, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2005).
' See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 28.
' See Hirsch, 2010 WL 3937303, at *1.
6 See id.; Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 4-5.
See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 4-5; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 120.45-60 (McKinney 2011) (defining the offense of stalking).
8 See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 34-35.
9 See Hirsch, 2010 WL 3937303, at *1.
'o See Id.; Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 4-5, 35.
" See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 5, 32. Ultimately, Hirsch brought an
action in the Eastern District of New York for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the
basis that this alleged violation of his self-incrimination privilege resulted in his
losing early release, his being adjudicated a higher level sex offender before release,
and his facing greater post-release restrictions once he returned to society. See
Hirsch, 2010 WL 3937303, at *1-2. The court dismissed his claims on grounds of
qualified immunity. Id. at *6-7.
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In part because of the unique and devastating impact that
sexual crimes have on their victims, sex offenses and the
individuals who commit them have, in recent years, been one of
the American public's central criminological concerns." This
concern has led to widespread state and federal legislation aimed
directly at sex offenders, including post-release registration,
community-notification, and civil-commitment laws.'3 The
Supreme Court has upheld the validity of this legislation on
different constitutional grounds.14 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court's pronouncements clearly indicate that the
constitutionality of such measures is an open question."
In addition to these measures, aimed at supervising or
confining sex offenders following the completion of their
sentences, states have created treatment programs for these
offenders as a means of rehabilitating them and, thus, as a
means of preventing recidivism. 6 Though sex offenders as a
group do not necessarily recidivate at higher levels than other
" See CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN SEX OFFENDER
MANAGEMENT 1 (2008), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/legislative
trends.pdf. The Center for Sex Offender Management is a joint project of the
United States Department of Justice, the National Institute of Corrections, the State
Justice Institute, and the American Probation and Parole Association. See id.
1 See id. at 3 ("[Approximately 20 states have specialized commitment laws,
and over 4,500 sex offenders are placed in secure civil commitment facilities
nationwide."); CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., AN OVERVIEW OF SEX OFFENDER
MANAGEMENT 7-8 (2002), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/csom-bro.pdf
[hereinafter MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW] (noting that all fifty states have enacted sex-
offender registration and community-notification laws).
"1 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954, 1965 (2010) (upholding,
as within the Necessary and Proper Clause, a federal statute authorizing the post-
sentence civil commitment of federal sex offenders deemed "sexually dangerous to
others") (internal quotation marks omitted); Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538
U.S. 1 (2003) (finding no procedural due process violation when state listed sex
offenders in its registry without first providing them with a hearing); Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. 84 (2003) (holding that retroactive application of sex offender registry and
notification requirements does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997) (holding that a statute providing for civil
commitment of sex offenders did not violate substantive due process because it made
'mental abnormality" a condition of post-sentence confinement, an early iteration of
the requirement laid out in Comstock).
" See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965 ("We do not reach or decide any claim that
the [federal civil commitment] statute or its application denies equal protection of
the laws, procedural or substantive due process, or any other rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. Respondents are free to pursue those claims on remand. . .
16 See MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 6-7.
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categories of offender,' 7  the belief that treatment and
rehabilitation are crucial to reducing the possibility of further
sexual offenses motivates these programs.s Additionally, clinical
concensus that participants must take responsibility for their
actions to render rehabilitation meaningful makes
acknowledging offenses of conviction and, even, offenses that
have gone un-prosecuted, an often unavoidable step in the
treatment process.' 9 Thus, refusing to admit responsibility may
ultimately disqualify an inmate from treatment.2 0
For fairly obvious reasons, in numerous states treatment
begins before the prisoner completes his sentence and returns to
society, a fact that has led to constitutional debate. As an
incentive to accepting treatment, many states make refusal a
detriment to a prisoner's privileges during incarceration and,
also, to when, if at all, the prisoner will attain early release; 21
" See CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX
OFFENDERS 2-3 (2000) [hereinafter MYTHS AND FACTS], available at http://www.
csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.pdf (noting that, while recidivism rates vary widely among
sex offenders according to a range of characteristics, "recidivism rates for sex
offenders are lower than for the general criminal population").
18 See CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., WHAT YOU NEED TO KNow ABOUT SEX
OFFENDERS 4 (2008), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/needtoknow-fs.pdf.
19 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33 (2002) ("Therapists and correctional
officers widely agree that clinical rehabilitative programs can enable sex offenders to
manage their impulses and in this way reduce recidivism.... An important
component of those rehabilitation programs requires participants to confront their
past and accept responsibility for their misconduct. . . . Research indicates that
offenders who deny all allegations of sexual abuse are three times more likely to fail
in treatment than those who admit even partial complicity.") (citations omitted);
Scott Michael Solkoff, Note, Judicial Use Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1441, 1450
(1993).
20 See Solkoff, supra note 19 ("W]ith few exceptions, the [sex offender
treatment] therapists interviewed said they would not accept anyone in their
program who absolutely denied sexual [mis]conduct .... Most firmly believed that
individuals who denied the abuse were not amenable to treatment.") (internal
quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF CORR. SERVS., OFFICE OF
GUIDANCE AND COUNSELING, SEX OFFENDER COUNSELING AND TREATMENT
PROGRAM GUIDELINES 16-17 (2008), available at http://www.doces.ny.gov/
ProgramServices/SOCTPGuidelinesNov08.pdf [hereinafter N.Y.S. TREATMENT
GUIDELINES] (correlating denial of responsibility with low amenability to sex
offender counseling and making denial a factor in barring continued participation).
21 See N.Y.S. TREATMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 17 ("[Riefusing sex
offender counseling ... may have [an impact on participants'] eligibility for certain
privileges such as transfers closer to home, earned eligibility, time allowance and
family reunion."); see, e.g., Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1203 (10th Cir.
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and yet, like the program that disqualified Hirsch, the programs
might not offer use immunity for statements made in
counseling.2 2 It has been disputed whether requiring
incarcerated sex offenders to admit responsibility for past
misconduct-without an offer of immunity and at the risk of
losing privileges or early release-violates the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.2 3
While in McKune v. Lile a plurality of the Supreme Court
ruled that withholding privileges for refusing to make such
admissions does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause, the
Court has never considered whether increasing an offender's
term of confinement does. 24 Lower courts-federal and state-
have addressed the issue, reaching divergent outcomes through
different analyses, and courts are in need of a uniform solution to
adjudicating these self-incrimination claims.2 5  The analysis
employed by the McKune plurality provides that solution. Part I
of this Note discusses the historical background of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and its
contemporary meaning in American case law. Part II examines
different approaches to the question of whether the sex offender
treatment programs discussed here violate that privilege.
Finally, Part III advances theories for determining the
constitutionality of these programs, evaluates their merits, and
ultimately argues that the McKune plurality's use of the
"atypical and significant hardship" standard is the most
functional and durable approach that any court has offered to
resolve this troubling, muddled, and constitutionally multi-
faceted question.
2004) (Colorado); Ainsworth v. Stanley, 317 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 2002) (New
Hampshire); Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2002) (Kansas)
(cases documenting consequences similar to those described in the Sex Offender
Counseling and Treatment Program Guidelines). This Note will use terms such as
'parole," "early release," and "good time" interchangeably.
22 See Hirsch v. Desmond, No. 08-CV-2660 (JS)(AKT), 2010 WL 3937303, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010).
23 See infra Part II.
24 See McKune, 536 U.S. at 29-31; infra Part II.A.
25 See infra Part II.B.
26 McKune, 536 U.S. at 37-38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. The Privilege in the Constitution
In the period following independence, most states included
some version of the privilege in their constitutions. The first
state to do so was Virginia, whose Declaration of Rights asserted
that, in criminal prosecutions, no person could "be compelled to
give evidence against himself."28 Between 1776 and 1784, the
eight states that also annexed bills of rights to their constitutions
included similar provisions.29 When the privilege was proposed
for inclusion in the United States Constitution, it was adopted
without opposition.30  These provisions likely reflected an
aversion to practices of the British crown, which had used
inquisitorial procedures such as the oath ex officio to torture and
persecute Protestant dissidents, including Puritans.3 '
Thus, though those at the adopting conventions only
infrequently referred to the privilege, it appears that they had
torture and inquisitorial procedures in mind. As written, the
clause reads simply, "No person. . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself'-note that the
phrase "self-incrimination" does not appear anywhere in the
27 See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 405 (1968).
28 See id. at 405-06.
" See id. at 407-08.
3o See MILTON MELTZER, THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 87 (1972).
11 The most infamous example of this practice occurred in the Royal Court of
Star Chamber. See R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 771 (1935).
The oath ex officio obliged the accused both to answer all questions posed by the
tribunal and to do so truthfully. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, IS THERE A RIGHT To
REMAIN SILENT? 66 (2008). This oath placed its subjects in what the Supreme Court
has described in other contexts as a "cruel trilemma": They risked conviction by
giving true testimony, conviction for contempt for violating the oath by refusing to
testify, or conviction for perjury by lying. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964); ALFREDO GARCIA, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH 9 (2002); see also Pittman, supra, at 771-72 (observing that Puritan
dissidents, as a precondition to sailing from England, were in some instances obliged
to take oaths of allegiance and recite Anglican prayers even as they waited aboard
ship to escape).
32 See GARCIA, supra note 31, at 16; Pittman, supra note 31, at 788.
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text." Yet interpreted according to the narrow import of its
terms, the privilege would have had no content; for by the time of
the Bill of Rights, there was little need to protect accused persons
from testamentary compulsion at trial because common law
forbade criminal defendants from testifying in any capacity-
either for or against themselves.34 This rule suggests that the
clause was intended to do more than prevent testamentary
compulsion; rather, it was likely intended also to prohibit
coercing confessions through torture, safeguard against excesses
like the oath ex officio, and protect those who refused to answer
potentially incriminating questions under oath from contempt
proceedings.
B. The Privilege in Twentieth-Century Case Law
Three lines of self-incrimination case law have developed
over the last century that are important to understanding the
privilege in the context of prison sex-offender counseling. The
first, which indicates the expansive protection of the privilege,
includes cases in which the Court has invalidated measures to
penalize the privilege's invocation. The second line, which begins
to delineate the privilege's limitations, encompasses cases in
which the Court has found the actual likelihood of incrimination
too remote to warrant protecting persons invoking the privilege
from penalty. Finally, further delineating the privilege's limits,
the Court has considered the privilege in circumstances in which
persons, both at trial and in the penological context, were forced
to choose between remaining silent or risking adverse
consequences.
31 See Ralph Rossum, "Self Incrimination": The Original Intent, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 273 (Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr., ed., Univ. Press of Va. 1991).
"' See id. at 276 ("Permitting a defendant to testify in his own behalf was a
nineteenth-century reform which began in the state courts in Maine in 1864 and in
the federal courts by an act of Congress in 1878.").
35 See MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 25 (1980). But see GARCIA, supra note 31,
at 8 (noting that historians have diverged as to the historical origin of the privilege
in America).
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1. The "Penalty" Cases
The "penalty cases" comprise the first line of law relevant to
this discussion-cases in which the Supreme Court has ruled
government may not attempt to compel testimony by penalizing
the privilege's invocation, nor use testimony attained by the
threat of such a penalty. Thus, in Malloy v. Hogan, the Court
overturned a Connecticut ruling finding the petitioner in
contempt for refusing to answer questions in an official inquiry.
While the Court analogized its decision to a line of cases rejecting
torture to obtain confessions, it went further, opining that the
privilege even protected against "inducing a person to confess
through sympathy falsely aroused, or other like inducement far
short of compulsion by torture . . . ." In sweeping terms, the
Court framed the privilege as "the right of a person to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own will, and to suffer no penalty . .. for such silence.""
In the ensuing years, the Court invalidated other iterations
of compelled testimony. In Garrity v. New Jersey, police officers
were told that, if they invoked their privilege against self-
incrimination and refused to answer questions in a state attorney
general investigation, they would lose their jobs. 39 The officers
relented and testified, and their answers were used against them
in a subsequent criminal prosecution.40 Saying, "Subtle
pressures may be as telling as coarse and vulgar ones,"41 the
Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination "prohibits
use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained
under threat of removal from office" and voided the officers'
convictions.4 2 Similarly, in Lefkowitz v. Turley, the Court held
that a state also cannot threaten losing state contracts to secure
36 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). The petitioner had also been ordered jailed until he was
willing to cooperate. See id.
17 Id. at 6-8 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Id. at 8.
3 See 385 U.S. 493, 494 (1967).
40 See id. at 495.
41 Id. at 496 (citations omitted).
42 See id. at 500. In a companion case, Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), the
Court, re-affirming its position that government may not impose "any sanction
which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege costly," held that an
attorney could not be disbarred for refusing to testify without immunity. Id. at 515
(internal quotation marks omitted).
1564 [Vol. 85:1557
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the privilege's waiver. 4 3  In so holding, the Court used now
famous language: "The [Fifth] Amendment not only
protects .. . against being involuntarily called as a witness
against [oneself] in a criminal prosecution but
also. . . answer[ing] official questions . .. in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
answers might incriminate [onel in future criminal
proceedings.""
Finally, in Griffin v. California, the Court held that the Self-
Incrimination Clause forbids prosecutorial comment or
instructions by the court that an accused's silence during a
criminal trial can be used as evidence of guilt.4 5 The Court
reasoned that, to do so, would make invoking the privilege costly;
and such a cost, said the Court, was an impermissible remnant of
the "inquisitorial system of criminal justice."4 6
2. The Incrimination Requirement
Despite this broad protection against government intrusion,
federal courts have limited the privilege to circumstances in
which the testimony sought to be compelled can reasonably be
expected to incriminate the witness.4 7 In Lefkowitz, the Court
reasoned that, once the government has granted a witness
immunity, because the government may no longer use
incriminating statements against her, it may compel testimony
through economic penalties, or even "by use of civil contempt and
coerced imprisonment."4 8 Furthermore, even when a state has
not granted a witness immunity, but when there is only a remote
risk of incrimination, the Self-Incrimination Clause does not
protect an individual from being compelled to testify:
' See 414 U.S. 70, 82 (1973) ("A waiver [of the privilege] secured under threat of
substantial economic sanction cannot be termed voluntary.").
4 Id. at 77; see also Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977) ("[Tlhe
touchstone of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion, and direct economic sanctions
and imprisonment are not the only penalties capable of forcing the self-incrimination
which the Amendment forbids.").
45 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
46 Id. at 614 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
41 See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Ripeness of Self-Incrimination Clause
Disputes, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1261, 1273 (2005) (describing this
incrimination requirement as a "rationale to limit the reach of the Clause").
I Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 84.
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A claim of... privilege must establish reasonable ground to
apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled ....
The danger.. . must be real and appreciable, with reference to
the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things,-
not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character,
having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible
49contingency ....
Thus, to warrant the privilege's protection, a witness must
establish some "real and appreciable fear" that the requested
information will be used to incriminate her, or that it will
"furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed" to prosecute
her.5 o
With respect to crimes for which an individual has already
been convicted or acquitted, the protections of the Double
Jeopardy clause may also nullify the necessity for, and thus the
right to, the privilege's protection.5' The Court has stated,
"[W]here there can be no further incrimination, there is no basis
for the assertion of the privilege."5 2 The availability of avenues
for collaterally attacking convictions makes the precise point at
which there is no longer a possibility of incrimination imperfectly
discernable, though there is consensus that the appreciable risk
ceases once a defendant's appeals-direct and discretionary-
terminate.53
4 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 190 (2004) (quoting
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896)) (alterations in original omitted)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Zicarelli v. N.J. State
Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972) ("It is well established that the
privilege [against self-incrimination] protects against real dangers, not remote and
speculative possibilities.").
5o Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 190 (finding an insufficient possibility of incrimination
when the defendant had never explained how the disclosure of his name could have
been used to prosecute him).
st See, e.g., Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833 (9th Cir. 1997).
2 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999).
* See id. (there can be no further incrimination when "the sentence has been
fixed and the judgment of conviction has become final"); see also United States v.
Kennedy, 372 F.3d 686, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[A] defendant's right to invoke the
Fifth Amendment as to events for which he has been convicted extends to the period
during which the conviction is pending appeal. Because any post-conviction evidence
could be used against a defendant if his conviction were to be overturned, the risk of
coerced self-incrimination remains until the conviction has been affirmed on
appeal."); United States v. Duchi, 944 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe Fifth
Amendment right not to testify concerning transactions for which one has been
convicted continues until the time for appeal has expired or until the conviction has
been affirmed on appeal."). But see Neal, 131 F.3d at 833 (finding only a remote
[Vol. 85:15571566
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3. The "Tough Choice" Cases
The outer limits of the self-incrimination privilege are
particularly apparent in the so-called "tough choice" cases, in
which persons navigating the criminal justice system have to
choose between invoking the privilege or risking sometimes grave
consequences." For example, the Court rejects the notion that
pressuring defendants to plead out-essentially, to incriminate
themselves-by offering lesser sentences, unconstitutionally
burdens the privilege.5 The Court has stated:
[N]ot every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right,
and not every pressure or encouragement to waive [it], is
invalid. Specifically, there is no per se rule against encouraging
guilty pleas. We have squarely held that a State may encourage
a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return ... .6
And in the penological context, self-incrimination rights are
even more subject to compromise. Because "[d]isciplinary
proceedings in state prisons . . . involve the correctional process
and important state interests other than conviction for crime,"
the Court has declined to extend Griffin to prison disciplinary
hearings where punitive segregation is at stake, ruling that
inmates' rights are not violated by having to choose between
risking self-incrimination through testifying or hurting their case
by having their silence imputed against them.57
II. THE PRIVILEGE AND SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT
In recent years, a new challenge has emerged in the
landscape of self-incrimination law. Inmates have challenged sex
offender treatment regimes like the one that expelled Joseph
Hirsch, wherein incarcerated sex offenders are required to make
possibility of incrimination after an inmate's opportunity to appeal had expired and
where the inmate expressed no desire to collaterally attack his conviction, thus
suggesting that availability of collateral attack also bears on the question).
" See Jonathan M. Rund, Note, McKune v. Lile: Evisceration of the Right
Against Self-Incrimination Through the Revival of Boyd v. United States, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 409, 414-15 (2003) (distinguishing the "penalty cases" from the
"tough choice cases").
15 See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978).
6 Id. at 218-19.
" See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1976). For a discussion of
Griffin, see supra text accompanying notes 45-46. For further discussion of the
reasoning in Baxter, see infra text accompanying notes 113-114.
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potentially self-incriminating admissions or risk losing early
release. The Supreme Court has addressed whether a state may
constitutionally withhold privileges from an inmate refusing to
make such admissions, but has never addressed whether a state
may also withhold early release. In the Supreme Court's wake,
lower courts have diverged when ruling on challenges to
programs that pointedly refuse to offer participants use
immunity for statements made in counseling, yet make expulsion
from treatment and, potentially, longer incarceration the
consequence for refusing to make such statements. Section A of
this Part will examine the Supreme Court decision holding that
states may constitutionally withhold privileges for refusing to
make potentially incriminating statements in sex-offender
counseling. Section B will examine the divergent analyses and
outcomes of lower courts that have addressed the question of
whether states may also increase inmates' period of incarceration
for such refusal.
A. McKune v. Lile
The Supreme Court's plurality decision in McKune v. Lile
governs this issue.' There, a sex offender treatment program,
without offering participants immunity, required them to admit
to their offenses of conviction and to complete a sexual history
form, regardless of whether that sexual history included un-
prosecuted crimes.59 The respondent, a sex offender, refused to
participate in the program on the grounds that the required
admissions violated his self-incrimination privilege.6 0 As a result
of his refusal, the prisoner's privilege status was downgraded,
resulting in a variety of consequences-the most severe of which
was his transfer from a medium- to a maximum-security unit.6 '
Finding the due process analysis of Sandin v. Conner
pertinent to analyzing self-incrimination challenges in the prison
context," a four-justice plurality reasoned that losing privileges
5 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
5 See id. at 30.
60 See id. at 31.
61 Id. at 38. The downgrade in the prisoner's privilege status also curtailed his
visitation rights, work opportunities, wage potential, ability to send money to family,
canteen expenditure, and television access. See id. at 30-31.
62 515 U.S. 472 (1995). In Sandin, the Court considered a due process challenge
by a prisoner confined to thirty-days' administrative segregation after a hearing
1568 [Vol. 85:1557
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for refusing to undergo sex-offender counseling, in light of Lile's
being incarcerated and the legitimate penological objective of
rehabilitating sex offenders, was compulsion in violation of the
Fifth Amendment only if it constituted an "atypical and
significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life."63 The plurality reasoned that for the consequences of
an inmate's choice to remain silent to be such a hardship, they
must be "closer to the physical torture against which the
[privilege] clearly protects" rather than "the de minimis harms
against which it does not."' By this reasoning, the plurality
determined that the loss of privileges at issue was not such a
hardship.65  The plurality left unanswered the question of
whether the state would have violated the Constitution had the
prisoner's decision "extend[ed] his term of incarceration . . . [or]
affect[ed] his eligibility for good-time credits or parole.""
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but objected to
the application of the "atypical and significant hardship"
standard on the basis that it was narrower than the compulsion
standard previously applied by the Court.67  Nevertheless, in
comparison to the kinds of economic punishments found to be
compulsion in cases like Lefkowitz v. Turley," O'Connor wrote, "I
where he could not present witnesses. See id. at 475-76. The Court noted the
problematic nature of federal judicial oversight of day-to-day management of state
prisons, and announced the principle, "[Flederal courts ought to afford appropriate
deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment."
Id. at 482. In light of these principles, the Court reasoned that prisoners' protected
liberty interests are "limited to freedom from restraint[s]" that do not exceed "the
sentence in such an unexpected manner" as to "impose[I atypical and significant
hardship[s] ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484. Under
this test, the Court held that, in light of the sanction imposed, the Due Process
Clause did not entitle the prisoner to have the opportunity to call witnesses in his
defense at the disciplinary hearing, even though the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments would guarantee such a right at trial. See id. at 487.
' McKune, 536 U.S. at 37-38 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I Id. at 41.
65 See id. at 35.
66 Id. at 38 (on the facts discussed above, the question was not before the Court).
67 See id. at 48 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the atypical and
significant hardship standard is broader than the ordinary self-incrimination
standard).
6 414 U.S. 70 (1973). O'Connor characterized the penalties at issue in those
cases: "[They] involved the potential loss of one's livelihood . . .. To support oneself
in one's chosen profession is one of the most important abilities a person can have. A
choice between incriminating oneself and being deprived of one's livelihood is the
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do not believe the penalties assessed against respondent in
response to his failure to incriminate himself are compulsive
[under] any reasonable test ....
B. Divergent Analyses and Outcomes After McKune
Other courts have now applied McKune to circumstances in
which the refusal to make statements in counseling that might
be self-incriminating has extended a prisoner's term of
incarceration or affected his eligibility for parole.7 o The circuits
have concurred in declining to apply the Sandin atypical and
significant hardship standard, instead applying the less definite
compulsion standard advocated by Justice O'Connor; doing so,
even though they have not expressly split,7' they have reached
divergent outcomes on whether such treatment regimes are
constitutional. In addition, one state court, applying the Sandin
due process standard, has held that such regimes do violate the
privilege against self-incrimination.
1. McKune in the Circuits: Different Analyses, Same Outcome
In Searcy v. Simmons, the Tenth Circuit considered the
constitutionality of an inmate's losing the ability to earn
additional good-time credits for refusing to participate in a
Kansas counseling program requiring sex offenders to divulge
past, un-prosecuted offenses without immunity.72 Noting that
McKune was a plurality decision, the court characterized the
inquiry according to O'Connor's concurrence: Whether the
consequences of the plaintiffs refusal were "so great as to
constitute compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination."" In determining that the
very sort of choice that is likely to compel someone to be a witness against himself."
McKune, 536 U.S. at 50.
6 McKune, 536 U.S. at 54.
70 See id. at 35 (plurality opinion).
7' But see Hirsch v. Desmond, No. 08-CV-2660(JS)(AKT), 2010 WL 3937303, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (noting the "circuit split" on the issue).
72 299 F.3d 1220, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2002).
73 Id. at 1225 (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 49) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
Searcy court based this conclusion on the narrowest grounds doctrine. See id.; Marks
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.") (internal quotation marks
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threatened loss of early release did not amount to such
compulsion, the Tenth Circuit found four factors controlling.
First, the court noted that Kansas regulations left the award of
good-time credits to the discretion of penal authorities and made
no guarantee of award for satisfactory behavior. Thus, the
court reasoned, the consequence of the plaintiffs refusal was "not
a new penalty, but only the withholding of a benefit
that ... [Kansas was] under no obligation to give."75 Second, the
court noted that the program was voluntary, insofar as the
plaintiff could choose to take advantage of a benefit, or else to
avoid making self-incriminating statements. Third, the court
observed that the admissions sought were clinically and
penologically central to rehabilitating sex offenders. Finally,
the court stated that the plaintiffs loss of good-time credits was
"not the result of his refusal to incriminate himself, but [was,
rather] a consequence of his inability to complete rehabilitation"
determined to be in his and society's best interest.
In Ainsworth v. Stanley, the First Circuit considered largely
similar factors in determining that denial of parole for failure to
participate in sex-offender counseling was not unconstitutional
compulsion.7 ' Noting that McKune was a plurality decision, the
court reasoned that Justice O'Connor's stance, that the loss of
privileges was not compulsion under any reasonable test, was
"arguably more narrow than the plurality's and therefore
constitute [d] the holding of the Court."80 The court observed that
(1) the consequence of the plaintiffs' refusal to participate in a
counseling program was not "a new or additional penalty," but
omitted); see also Ainsworth v. Stanley, 317 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002) (reasoning on
the same basis that Justice O'Connor's stance in McKune was more narrow than the
plurality's and therefore constituted the holding of the Court).
74 See Searcy, 299 F.3d at 1226.
7 Id.
76 See id.
7 See id. at 1227.
78 Id. (in this sense, the refusal to incriminate himself did not directly cause the
loss of good time; rather, the refusal to participate in treatment was the basis for the
loss of good time). The Tenth Circuit has again considered this issue in the context of
a similar treatment program in Colorado. See Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191,
1193 (10th Cir. 2004) (no unconstitutional compulsion where refusal to participate in
sex offender counseling resulted in loss of opportunity to earn good-time credits at a
higher rate).
" 317 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2002).
Id. at 4 (quoting Lurie v. Wittner, 228 F.3d 113, 130 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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merely the withholding of a discretionary benefit that the
government was entitled to condition on completion of the
program; (2) even though refusing to participate came with
certain consequences, the program was ultimately voluntary;
(3) the admission of crimes is widely believed to be necessary for
the successful treatment of sex offenders, and so the government
has a valid interest in establishing a treatment program that
requires sex offenders to admit to past conduct as a condition of
participation; and, finally, (4) the denial of parole for failing to
participate was not automatic, even though "the vast majority of
parolees had completed the [program] prior to release.""
2. McKune in the Circuits: Same Analysis, Different Outcome
In United States v. Antelope, however, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that similar circumstances did amount to unconstitutional
compulsion.8 2 There, the appellant was sentenced in district
court to five-years' probation for sex offenses and was required,
as part of his sentence, to complete counseling." His repeated
refusal to make potentially incriminating disclosures in
counseling led the district court to impose a variety of penalties,
including revoking his probation and sentencing him to
additional periods of incarceration and supervised release.84 On
review, the Ninth Circuit noted that, despite the government's
legitimate interest in requiring sex offenders to admit to past
misconduct, the "irreconcilable constitutional problem ... is
that ... the disclosures ... may be starkly incriminating, and
there is no disputing that the government may seek to use such
81 Id. at 5. For another circuit's use of very similar factors, see Defoy v.
McCullough, 301 F. App'x 177, 181-82, 181 n.7, 182 n.9 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding no
unconstitutional compulsion where (1) inmate was merely required to serve the rest
of his sentence; (2) loss of parole was the result of his voluntary choice not to
participate in a valid treatment program; (3) state had a legitimate penological
interest in eliciting potentially incriminating statements for the purposes of
rehabilitation, and (4) loss of parole for failure to participate was not completely
automatic).
82 395 F.3d 1128, 1139 (2005).
* See id. at 1131.
* See id. at 1131-32. Specifically, the court imposed six months of additional
monitoring; revoked appellant's probation and sentenced him to twenty months of
prison and three-years of supervised release; and, finally, following release from that
period of incarceration, sentenced him to an additional ten months of prison and
another twenty-six months of supervised release. Id.
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disclosures for prosecutorial purposes."5  As in Searcy and
Ainsworth, the court treated Justice O'Connor's opinion as
controlling." Because O'Connor stated that "she would not have
found a penalty of 'longer incarceration' such as that here to be
constitutionally permissible," the Ninth Circuit held that
revoking appellant's conditional liberty for refusing to make the
potentially self-incriminating statements in sex offender
treatment violated his Fifth Amendment rights.
3. Minnesota: McKune's Analysis, Different Outcome
In Johnson v. Fabian," the Supreme Court of Minnesota
arrived at the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit, but did so by
a route not taken since McKune v. Lile. The court considered the
petitions of two incarcerated sex offenders.89  The first, whose
appeals were pending, was ordered to participate in a sex-
offender counseling program in which he was expected to admit
to his offenses of conviction." He refused to participate to avoid
jeopardizing his appeals and so incurred a sanction that pushed
back his eligibility for parole by forty-five days. 1 The second
inmate had testified at his trial that he was innocent and, when
ordered to undergo counseling, refused to do so because
admitting to his offenses of conviction might subject him to
prosecution for perjury; as a result, he incurred the same forty-
five day extension.92
" Id. at 1137-38.
86 See id. at 1133 n.1.
1 Id. at 1138 (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 52 (2002)) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). The Second Circuit has, implicitly, dealt with the issue in the same way
as the Ninth Circuit: In Donhauser v. Goord, 181 Fed. App'x 11 (2d Cir. 2006), the
court considered a district decision finding that threatening a loss of early release for
failing to make self-incriminating statements in sex offender counseling was
unconstitutional compulsion. See id. at 12; Donhauser v. Goord, 314 F. Supp. 2d 119,
123, 129 n.8 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). The Court reversed and remanded for procedural
reasons but impliedly accepted the district court's holding by recommending the
defendants consider immunizing disclosures made in counseling. Donhauser, 181
Fed. App'x at 12; see also Edwards v. Laidlair, No. 9:07-cv-00059-JKS, 2008 WL
3156214, at *5 n.7 (noting that in Donhauser the Second Circuit agreed sub silentio
that the denial of good time credits at issue gave rise to a viable Fifth Amendment
claim).
c 735 N.W.2d 295, 311-12 (Minn. 2007).
9 See id. at 297.
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In ruling that both inmates' self-incrimination privilege had
been violated, the court followed an approach-for which this
Note advocateS93-rejected by every federal court of appeals to
consider the issue. While citing-like the First, Tenth and Ninth
Circuits had-the narrowest grounds doctrine, the court
contradicted those circuits by determining the McKune plurality's
rationale was narrower, and thus more controlling, than
O'Connor's concurrence94 ; so finding, Minnesota applied the
atypical and significant hardship standard."
Even still, the court did not reach the same outcome as the
McKune plurality, concluding that, because Minnesota's statute
mandated early release-rather than leaving it to the discretion
of an administrative body-inmates there had a protected liberty
interest in parole that rendered extended incarceration an
atypical and significant hardship." Therefore, the court held
9 See infra Part III.D-E.
94 "'[Wlhen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale . .. enjoys
the assent of the five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred ... on the narrowest grounds.'"
Johnson, 735 N.W.2d at 304 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Note that it was on this same basis that
the courts in Searcy, Ainsworth, and Antelope determined that, in fact, O'Connor's
concurrence was controlling. The Minnesota court's determination rested, in large
part, on O'Connor's explicitly stating that the Court's prior self-incrimination
analysis was "broader" than the atypical and significant hardship standard. See
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 48 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
For more discussion, see infra, note 96.
9 See Johnson, 735 N.W.2d at 304. Explaining this conclusion, the court stated,
"Justice O'Connor .. . disagreed with the application of the Sandin test because she
considered [it] too narrow for identifying compulsion under the Fifth Amendment. In
other words, Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality's rationale that a
consequence that satisfies the Sandin 'atypical and significant hardship' test would
constitute compulsion for Fifth Amendment purposes. Her disagreement with the
plurality was that she believed the test for compulsion should be broader, meaning
that some consequences that do not satisfy the Sandin test may nevertheless
constitute compulsion." Id. (citations omitted); see McKune, 536 U.S. at 48
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I agree with [the dissent] that the Fifth Amendment
compulsion standard is broader than the 'atypical and significant hardship' standard
we have adopted for evaluating due process claims in prisons.") (emphasis added).
6 Johnson, 735 N.W.2d at 302, 308-09. In Minnesota, a prisoner's sentence
comprised two parts: a term of imprisonment constituting two thirds of the total
sentence, and a term of supervised release, constituting the remaining third of the
total sentence. See id. at 299. While the total sentence could not be extended by
disciplinary infractions, they could extend the imprisonment period up to the length
of the total sentence. See id. A presumption, however, existed that the prisoner
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that penalizing the two inmates' refusal to make statements in
counseling that might incriminate them-by jeopardizing one's
appeal and subjecting the other to prosecution for perjury-
violated the privilege against self-incrimination.
III. RESOLUTION: TIDYING THE LANDSCAPE
The fact that cases such as Joseph Hirsch's continue to arise
suggests that the untidy landscape of self-incrimination
jurisprudence that has emerged from McKune requires
resolution." In proposing a resolution to this problem, this Part
will first consider two approaches that would categorically forbid
withholding privileges, as well as extending confinement, for an
inmate's refusal to make un-immunized admissions in
counseling. The first approach challenges the analytical basis for
treating the Self-Incrimination Clause as flexible-able to bend
to make room for competing state interests. It fails because it
does not realistically assess self-incrimination case law and,
ultimately, does little to protect prisoners' interests. The second
approach challenges the clinical legitimacy of these programs. It
fails because, while there may be scientific disagreement about
properly structuring sex offender rehabilitation programs, courts
cannot adequately gauge constitutionality on the basis of clinical
and scientific arguments about which reasonable practitioners
may disagree.
Next, this Part will explore three frameworks within which
courts can analyze prisoners' self-incrimination claims, using the
case of Joseph Hirsch as a paradigm for their application. The
first considers whether statements in sex-offender counseling,
even if un-immunized, are actually incriminating. This practical
and efficient inquiry disposes of a substantial number of
potential claims by revealing that, in fact, there is frequently no
would be released after the two-thirds period unless he incurred disciplinary
infractions, thus creating a liberty interest in early release. See id. at 302.
" See id. at 308-09.
9 In yet another recent case, a plaintiff asked the Western District of New York
for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on substantially the same grounds as Joseph
Hirsch. See Sayles v. Fischer, No. 08-CV-0747, 2011 WL 1199834, at *1-2 (W.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2011). The court, because of the lack of consensus among the circuits,
resolved the case in favor of the defendants on qualified immunity grounds, just like
the court in Hirsch. See Sayles, 2011 WL 1199834, at *9; Hirsch v. Desmond, No. 08-
CV-2660 (JS)(AKT), 2010 WL 3937303, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010).
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realistic chance of a prisoner's actually incriminating herself in
such a program. Unfortunately, this approach will not dispose of
all potential claims.99 A second approach arises out of the post-
McKune jurisprudence-specifically the circuits'-and balances
states' and prisoners' interests by considering a variety of factors.
While this approach harmonizes some of the apparent divergence
in post-McKune jurisprudence, it involves distinctions and
questions that ultimately make it unsatisfactory. Finally, this
Part will propose adopting the third approach-the McKune
plurality's-under which a consequence can only constitute
compulsion for self-incrimination purposes if it constitutes an
atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life. This approach is the most functional
because it appreciates the reality of self-incrimination
jurisprudence, does not require inquiries ill suited to the judicial
capacity, and balances both states' legitimate interests and
prisoners' constitutional rights.
A. Responding to Criticism of McKune
1. The Analytical Argument
One argument against the programs discussed above
challenges the McKune court's self-incrimination analysis itself.
The McKune plurality analyzed the self-incrimination question
within a borrowed due process framework. 00 Within such a
framework, whether a particular hardship is unconstitutionally
compelling depends on the context in which that hardship is
threatened or imposed. 10 Thus, while prisoners' self-
incrimination privileges do not "terminate at the jailhouse door,"
in light of the inherent-and constitutional-restrictions of
prison life, consequences that violate the privilege in free society
do not necessarily do so when imposed on prisoners. 102 So, while
' Part of the attractiveness of this approach is its status as a longstanding and
well-settled self-incrimination principle. See Mannheimer, supra note 47, at 1273,
1273 n.56 (tracing this rationale as far back as 1861).
100 See McKune, 536 U.S. at 37-38. This is the Sandin atypical and significant
hardship standard. Id. at 37.
101 See id. at 36 ("The fact that these consequences are imposed on prisoners,
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the "penalty" cases make unconstitutional even the comparably
trivial threat of ineligibility to receive state contracts, it would be
a mistake to transport their reasoning wholesale into the prison
context. 10
But this framework for analyzing self-incrimination
challenges has been criticized as being at odds with the nature of
the Self-Incrimination Clause itself. For example, a provision
like the Due Process Clause does not mandate any particular
process; rather, what process is due depends on a variety of
circumstances. 104 In a similar vein, the Fourth Amendment
forbids searches and seizures that are "unreasonable," and what
searches are reasonable will vary by scenario.' The Self-
Incrimination Clause, however, confers a substantive protection
not limited to what is reasonable, or what is due, under the
circumstances; and-so it has been claimed-it is intellectually
inconsistent to apply it differently depending on such
circumstances as who claims its protections."0o In light of this
reasoning, it would be a mistake to transport a due process
standard, by which a state's competing penological interest can
outweigh, for example, a prisoner's right to call witnesses in his
defense at a prison administrative hearing, into the realm of the
inviolable self-incrimination privilege.10
While this argument has logical appeal, it is simply at odds
with the Court's self-incrimination jurisprudence. Certainly, the
penalty cases demonstrate the privilege's resilience and the
expansiveness of its protections.0 s Nevertheless, the "tough
choice" cases expose the fact that these protections have an outer
limit. 09 They demonstrate that the privilege has never been
interpreted to be absolutely inviolable, regardless of the
10 Id. at 40-41; See also supra Part I.B.1.
10 See Rund, supra note 54, at 432-33; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334 (1976) ("Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.") (alterations in
original omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Rund, supra note 54, at 409.
10 See Rund, supra note 54, at 409, 433; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Confessing
in the Human Voice: A Defense of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 7
CARDOZO PUB. L. POLY & ETHICS J. 121, 127-28 (2008).
107 See supra note 62; see also Taslitz, supra note 106; Rund, supra note 54, at
409, 433.
1" See supra Part I.B.1.
10o See supra Part I.B.3.
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circumstances under which it is invoked; rather, they show that
the privilege, like many constitutional rights, may be burdened
to accommodate competing governmental interests."10
Moreover, the Court has explicitly sanctioned burdening the
privilege in the prison context when important state penological
interests are in play. Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality
in McKune, explained the outcomes in the tough choice cases:
"[Tihis Court has recognized that lawful conviction and
incarceration necessarily place limitations on the exercise of a
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.""' Thus, in
Baxter v. Palmigiano, while the Court recognized that Griffin112
prevents the factfinder from treating a criminal defendant's
silence as evidence of guilt at trial, it was constitutional to
impute an inmate's silence in a disciplinary proceeding in state
prison against him because such proceedings "involve the
correctional process and important state interests other than
conviction for crime."1 3 Understood in light of Justice Kennedy's
explanation, therefore, it is not logically inconsistent, nor un-
precedented, to apply the Self-Incrimination Clause in the
context of prison sex-offender counseling-where the important
state interest of rehabilitating sex offenders is involved-
differently than with non-convicted and presumed innocent
persons.
There is a further flaw in this approach: It could actually
harm prisoners' interests by leading to longer sentences. As one
writer who opposes the McKune decision has suggested, to allow
sex offenders to make admissions in counseling without the
prospect of prosecution, or to allow them to avoid counseling
consequence free, would be to risk excessive leniency toward a
particularly troublesome category of offender."' To avoid this
leniency, and to ensure that society responds appropriately to
no See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 216, 222-23 (1978) (discussing the
constitutionality of burdening a defendant's self-incrimination privilege in light of
the substantial benefits to the state of maintaining a plea-bargaining scheme).
n' McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 38 (2002).
112 See generally 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
113 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (citing Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965)). Baxter is one of the tough choice cases. See supra Part LB.3.
n' See McKune, 536 U.S. at 40 (not to do so would be to treat the fact of
respondent's incarceration "as if it were irrelevant").
"' See Rund, supra note 54, at 438.
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these offenses, he recommends coupling immunity in counseling
with an increase in the length of sex offenders' sentences.116 But
such an approach, offered for the sake of intellectual consistency,
is plainly harmful to the human interests of the prisoners whose
self-incrimination privilege it supposedly protects: Despite
virulent public sentiment against sex offenders, most sex
offenders do not spend their lives in prison.117 States are under
no obligation to rehabilitate sex offenders, and state legislatures
could simply foreclose the possibility of parole for sex offenders
altogether."18 Thus, while these programs may give rise to
constitutional quandaries, one alternative-simply to treat sex
offenders as too dangerous to warrant rehabilitation, and to
eliminate programs that make society amenable to their
release-would undoubtedly be worse for inmates."'
2. Lack of Psychological Efficacy
Another approach attacks the psychological and therapeutic
validity of these programs to prove their unconstitutionality. As
an initial matter, courts, commentators, and health practitioners
agree that rehabilitation is central to reducing recidivism among
sex offenders. 20 In addition, there is also agreement that
n1 See id.
n1 Merrill A. Maiano, Comment, Sex Offender Probationers and the Fifth
Amendment: Rethinking Compulsion and Exploring Preventative Measures in the
Face of Required Treatment Programs, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989, 996 (2006).
nI See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979) (holding no constitutional right to early release from a validly imposed
sentence).
1" Speaking of the respondent's transfer from a medium- to a maximum-
security unit, the McKune plurality wrote, "Respondent's reasoning would provide
States with perverse incentives to assign all inmates convicted of sex offenses to
maximum security prisons .... The rule would work to the detriment of the entire
class of sex offenders who might not otherwise be placed in maximum-security
facilities." McKune, 536 U.S. at 46. Likewise, states could simply cease
rehabilitating sex offenders in preparation for early release and stop releasing them
early altogether. Presumably, states could even legislate life sentences for sex
offenses and abandon any efforts at rehabilitation.
120 See id. at 33 (noting that rehabilitation programs enable offenders to manage
their impulses and avoid re-offending); United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128,
1137-38 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Often sex offenders repeat their past offenses, and
informed counseling can only help protect them, their potential victims, and
society.") (citations omitted); MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 8 (noting
that treatment of sex offenders has the greatest chance of reducing recidivism); Jon
J. Kear-Colwell, A Personal Position on the Treatment of Individuals who Commit
Sexual Offenses, 40 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 259, 260
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admitting responsibility is important to successful offender
rehabilitation, and thus that it is a valid obligatory step in any
treatment plan. 12 1
The divergence in opinion as to the psychological efficacy of
these programs comes at the point where admissions in
counseling are not immunized, and where non-participation
comes with certain consequences, including longer confinement.
Opponents argue that backing up the admission requirement
with potentially negative consequences is actually detrimental to
offender rehabilitation,1 2 2 and that there is no clinical support for
the view that requiring admissions to be un-immunized has
rehabilitative value.123 If these programs, then, actually hinder
the state's legitimate penological objective of rehabilitating sex
(1996) ("With adequate treatment programs, it has been shown that the risk of
reoffending can be significantly reduced .... Treatment ... will prevent some future
victims from being assaulted."); Maiano, supra note 117, at 997 ("Researchers
remain optimistic that treatment can reduce sex offender recidivism.").
121 See McKune, 536 U.S. at 33 (noting the importance of sex offenders'
confronting their past and accepting responsibility); Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1137 ("We
do not doubt that [the] policy of requiring convicted sex offenders to give a sexual
history, admitting responsibility for past misconduct to .. . counselors, serves an
important rehabilitative purpose."); Judith V. Becker, Offenders: Characteristics and
Treatment, FUTURE OF CHILD., Summer/Fall 1994, at 176, 187 ("A sex offender can
be considered amenable to treatment only if he acknowledges that he has committed
a sexual offense . . . ."); Anita M. Schlank & Theodore Shaw, Treating Sexual
Offenders Who Deny Their Guilt: A Pilot Study, 8 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. &
TREATMENT 17, 18 (1996) ("Most therapists agree ... that the first goal of treatment
is to assist the perpetrator in acknowledging that he has a problem involving sexual
behavior... . [O]ffenders [who deny responsibility] are more likely to reoffend
following their release than those who have admitted their guilt. . . .").
122 Rebecca Johansen, Note, The Ruse of Rehabilitation: The Supreme Court's
Misconception of Coercion in Sexual Offender Rehabilitation Programs, 12 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 763, 784 (2008) ("[Plrisoners will confess to avoid negative
consequences, but they will not actually take any ownership over what happened.
Not only does this type of confession fail to further the rehabilitative purpose, but it
can even hinder it."); Abigail E. Robinson, Comment, Treating the Sex Offender at
Any Cost: Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination in the
Prison Context, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 725, 749 (2003) ("[Dlenying immunity
actually .. . damages therapeutic success.").
123 See Johansen, supra note 122, at 771 (claiming that, while the McKune
plurality used rehabilitation as its basis for rejecting an immunity requirement, it
cited no psychological evidence for this conclusion); see also McKune, 536 U.S. at 69
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (deriding the lack of evidence that the program's aims could
not be served equally well by granting use immunity).
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offenders, they do not justify burdening prisoners' right to be free
from compelled self-incrimination; in fact, the inefficacy of the
programs makes them not only unreasonable, but arbitrary. 124
There is, however, at least some clinical support for the view
that limiting patient freedom to choose not to participate in
therapy may at times be in both the patient's and society's best
interest-particularly when the patient poses a significant and
demonstrable risk to others as convicted sex offenders have been
provent to do.125  While such limits are, from a variety of
perspectives, not ideal, they reflect a balancing of interests and
attention to the particular settings and purposes of treatment. 2 6
Moreover, incentivizing participation in sex-offender
counseling, and refusing to immunize admissions made there,
may have a valid rehabilitative purpose and, at the very least,
may not hinder rehabilitation. In a recent long-term study of the
Minnesota sex offender rehabilitation program-the same
program addressed in Johnson v. Fabian' 2 7-researchers found
that, despite a lack of immunity, participation in prison sex-
offender counseling reduced the risk of sexually re-offending
behavior by twenty-seven percent.128 The researchers recognized
that inmates could refuse to participate, but risked lengthening
their confinement if they did; but rather than reducing the
efficacy of the program, they concluded that this system may
actually have motivated prisoners to participate who otherwise
would not not have been treated.129
Ultimately, the objective of offering this contrary evidence is
not to resolve a debate that is essentially a matter of clinical
decision-making about the most appropriate means of
124 Johansen, supra note 122, at 791; Robinson, supra note 122, at 748.
125 See John S. Carroll, Consent to Mental Health Treatment: A Theoretical
Analysis of Coercion, Freedom, and Control, 9 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 129, 129 (1991).
126 See id. at 139-40. For example, "the alternative of encouraging personal
responsibility ... until the [prospective patient] commits a crime . .. seems to
abdicate our collective responsibility and creates substantial risks." Id. at 140.
127 735 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. 2007). See supra Part II.B.3.
128 Grant Duwe & Robin A. Goldman, The Impact of Prison-Based Treatment on
Sex Offender Recidivism: Evidence from Minnesota, 21 SExUAL ABUSE: J. RES. &
TREATMENT 279, 296 (2009). The study evaluated recidivism among 2,040 sex
offenders released from Minnesota prisons between 1990 and 2003, before the
decision in Johnson. See id. at 279.
129 See id. at 283 (reasoning that this approach "likely motivated many offenders
to enter treatment programming who might have otherwise opted not to do so if the
choice were entirely voluntary").
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rehabilitating sex offenders; rather, it shows the limits of
attempting to resolve the issue in a judicial setting. Such choices
are better left to the professionals charged by law-making and
administrative bodies with administering rehabilitation
programs whose ultimate end is the protection of society from
recidivist sex offenders.3 0 It is for this reason that courts-who,
despite their clinical and scientific incompetence, must
nevertheless rule on the constitutionality of such programs-
should not resort to clinical arguments in making that
determination when there is reasonable disagreement in the
psychological community.
B. Applying the Incrimination Requirement
Applying the incrimination requirement to these counseling
regimes, it becomes clear that, for a substantial number of
participants, there is no possibility that their privilege against
self-incrimination can be violated. Joseph Hirsch's case provides
an example of how this requirement operates. Hirsch feared that
admitting to the penetration allegation in his probation report
would subject him to prosecution for rape.' However, because
Hirsch was acquitted of this charge,3 2 the Double Jeopardy
Clause would in all likelihood have prevented him from being re-
prosecuted.13 Hirsch also feared that admitting to his offenses of
130 For example, the plurality in McKune stated as its first justification for the
validity of not offering immunity to program participants, "[Tihe professionals who
design and conduct the program have concluded that for SATP participants to accept
full responsibility for their past actions, they must accept the proposition that those
actions carry consequences. . . . [T]he potential for additional punishment reinforces
the gravity of the participants' offenses and thereby aids in their rehabilitation."
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002).
131 See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 4-5.
132 See Hirsch v. Desmond, No. 08-CV-2660 (JS)(AKT), 2010 WL 3937303, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010).
133 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ."); Fong Foo v. United States,
369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (holding that a directed verdict of acquittal is not
reviewable, even if entered on an "egregiously erroneous foundation"). That an
acquitted offense appeared in Hirsch's probation report is not inconsistent with
established law. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154 (1997) (holding that a
court may consider acquitted charges for sentencing purposes); Vega v. Lantz, 596
F.3d 77, 80, 83 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding no constitutional violation where department
of corrections officially labeled an inmate a sex offender on the basis of an acquitted
charge); Billiteri v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-45 (2d Cir. 1976)
(suggesting that parole boards can take into account acquitted offenses in making
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conviction might incriminate him because his case was on
appeal. 13 4 But by the time that Hirsch was asked to admit to the
conduct in the probation report, he had exhausted his direct
appeals and his federal habeas petition had been denied. 1 35 In
these circumstances, the near impossibility of his conviction's
being overturned and a new trial being ordered suggest that
Hirsch could not reasonably have feared further incrimination
with respect to his offenses of conviction. 36  Finally, Hirsch
feared prosecution for the stalking allegations.13 1 In New York, a
prosecutor must commence a misdemeanor stalking prosecution
within two years of the offense. 3 s Hirsch was convicted on
January 3, 2002, and the alleged stalking occurred between his
initial arrest and conviction.'3  Thus, in 2006 when Hirsch
entered SOCP he could not have been prosecuted for
misdemeanor stalking and, so, incriminating himself with
respect to these allegations would have been extremely
unlikely-an extraordinary and nearly impossible contingency.
their decisions). This paper does not address the therapeutic validity of requiring an
offender to admit to acquitted offenses in counseling. Cf Hirsch, 2010 WL 3937303,
at *8 ("[N]o clearly established law require[s] the State to, for therapeutic purposes,
ignore evidence of Hirsch's conduct, simply because that evidence was insufficient to
convict him beyond a reasonable doubt.").
13' See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 35.
... See People v. Hirsch, 299 A.D.2d 559, 750 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2d Dep't 2002)
(affirming conviction); People v. Hirsch, 99 N.Y.2d 629, 790 N.E.2d 284, 760
N.Y.S.2d 110 (2003) (denying review); Hirsch v. Plescia, No. 03-CV-1617(DLI), 2005
WL 2038587, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2005) (denying petition for writ of habeas
corpus); see also supra note 53 (discussing cases supporting the proposition that
there can be no incrimination once a conviction has been affirmed on appeal).
13 See, e.g., Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding
possibility of prosecution related to statements made during sex offender counseling
insufficiently real where double jeopardy precluded further prosecution for offenses
of conviction and where plaintiff expressed no intention to collaterally attack his
conviction); Zaire v. West, No. 04-CV-6217L, 2008 WL 4852677, at *11 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 6, 2008) (dismissing self-incrimination claims as "remote and speculative"
because "[plaintiffs] direct appeal had concluded years before .. . [the] decision to
remove his 10 years of good time credits for failure to complete the sex offender
counseling program[,] . .. [and plaintiffs] federal collateral challenges to his state
conviction were completed. . . .").
117 See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 4.
138 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(c) (McKinney 2011) (defining
limitations period for misdemeanors in New York); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.45-50
(defining misdemeanor stalking).
13' See Hirsch v. Desmond, No. 08-CV-2660 (JS)(AKT), 2010 WL 3937303, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010); Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 13.
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The incrimination prong, however, may not have completely
disposed of Hirsch's potential self-incrimination claim. In the
event that the stalking in question rose to the level of a felony,
the limitations period would have been five years.140  So,
depending on exactly when the stalking occurred, the limitations
period may not have expired by the time Hirsch entered SOCP.
Moreover, Hirsch may have testified in his own defense.'4 '
Courts have treated exposure to prosecution for perjury as
sufficiently hazardous to violate the Self-Incrimination Clause.142
In the event that Hirsch testified to his innocence at trial, an
admission of guilt in SOCP could have exposed him to
prosecution for lying on the stand.143 Finally, many sex offender
treatment programs require inmates to admit their entire sexual
history, even if such history contains un-prosecuted offenses; in
such a case, there would be no double jeopardy protection.'" So,
though the incrimination inquiry exposes the fact that, because
of double jeopardy protections, the finality of judgments, and
140 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(b) (McKinney 2011) (defining
limitations period for felonies in New York); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.55-60
(McKinney 2011) (defining felony stalking).
141 At Hirsch's sentencing hearing, his attorney objected to several portions of
the probation report, including the portion pertaining to the stalking allegations. In
his remarks, he suggested that, if the allegations had any credibility, the district
attorney would have cross-examined his client about them, thus implying that
Hirsch did, in fact, testify in his defense. See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at
13-14.
142 See Johnson v. Fabian, 735 N.W.2d 295, 311 (Minn. 2007) (concluding that
exposure to perjury prosecution arising out of conflict between trial testimony and
statements in counseling presented a "real and appreciable risk of incrimination"
sufficient to violate the Constitution).
14 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(b) (McKinney 2011) (defining
limitations period for felonies in New York); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.15 (McKinney
2011) (defining given false testimony as a felony).
144 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 30 (2002) ("Participating inmates also are
required to complete a sexual history form, which details all prior sexual activities,
regardless of whether such activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses.");
Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002) ("In completing the sexual
history form, [participants] must list sexual activities where they were the
perpetrator and a victim was involved, regardless of whether criminal charges were
brought in response to the activity in question."); Ainsworth v. Stanley, 317 F.3d 1, 2
(1st Cir. 2002) ("New Hampshire's [sex offender counseling program] ... require[s]
participants to accept responsibility for ... any other sexual offenses they may have
committed."). In New York, if such un-prosecuted offenses constituted rape,
aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree, or engaging in a course of sexual
conduct with a child in the first degree, there would be no limitations period. See
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(a) (McKinney 2011).
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statutes of limitations, a substantial quantity of inmates simply
cannot incriminate themselves in counseling, it ultimately does
not address the full scope of the incrimination-in-counseling
problem.
C. The Four-Factor Inquiry
1. Overview
Jurisprudence in the wake of McKune presents another
avenue for disposing of inmate self-incrimination claims, one that
balances a state's penological interests with an inmate's
constitutional rights. The courts in Searcy v. Simmons and
Ainsworth v. Stanley determined that the applicable holding of
McKune was not the atypical and significant hardship standard
advocated by the plurality, but was, rather, contained in Justice
O'Connor's somewhat formless statement, "I do not believe the
penalties assessed against respondent in response to his failure
to incriminate himself are compulsive on any reasonable
test. . . ."1 4 5 Both courts then sought to determine whether the
consequences of the inmates' refusals were "so great as to
constitute compulsion for the purposes of the" Self-Incrimination
Clause without reference to the atypical and significant hardship
standard. 146
From both courts' analyses, a four-factor test emerges that
can guide courts in measuring the constitutionality of sex-
offender counseling programs. First, the courts gauged the
inmates' liberty interest in attaining early release. Second, the
courts asked whether the programs were mandated by order or
voluntary. Third, the courts noted the centrality of the required
admissions to effective rehabilitation of sex offenders-that is,
the courts weighed the states' interest in conditioning treatment
and early release on potentially incriminating admissions. And,
finally, the courts measured the connection between the refusal
to make the admissions and the denial of early release, asking
141 McKune, 536 U.S. at 54 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Searcy, 299 F.3d at
1225; Ainsworth, 317 F.3d at 4.
146 See Searcy, 299 F.3d at 1225. The Ainsworth court described O'Connor's
opinion as offering "no clear guideposts," and described its own approach to whether
the plaintiff had been unconstitutionally compelled as "resort[ing] to our own sound
judgment, so long as it does not conflict with existing precedent." Ainsworth, 317
F.3d at 4.
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whether the denial was an automatic consequence of the inmate's
refusal to make the admissions and subsequent disqualification
from therapy, or whether such refusal and disqualification were
merely considered among other relevant factors.1 This Note
will apply the four-factor test to Joseph Hirsch's case to
demonstrate how it would dispose of the issue. At the outset,
however, this Note recognizes that courts are always likely to
find the third factor weighty, regardless of the other factors,
which are likely to vary from state to state and program to
program.
a. State's Interest in Rehabilitation
A state's interest in rehabilitation is almost always likely to
be given heavy weight in the four-factor inquiry. Released sex
offenders are more likely than any other type of offender to be re-
arrested for a new rape or sexual assault.14 Though some
studies suggest sex offenders are less likely than other categories
of offender to commit another crime-that is, a sex crime or
otherwise-following their release, the extreme seriousness of
sex offenses makes reducing sexual reoffending a priority.'4 9
Moreover, because most sex offenders do not receive life
sentences, they will eventually return to the community, making
their successful rehabilitation a priority. 5 0  And, as has been
discussed, sex offender treatment programs are essential to
rehabilitating sex offenders and reducing their rates of
recidivism.'' Admission of responsibility is central to the success
of such treatment, and states should not be obligated to make an
admission consequence free by offering immunity: Such a
position would undermine the state's penological and therapeutic
message to offenders about the seriousness of their crimes.15 2
Moreover, states should be entitled to provide disincentives, such
as the loss of early release, to encourage successful and
147 See infra Part III.C.1.c.
'm See McKune, 536 U.S. at 33; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 6 (1997).
1 See Maiano, supra note 117, at 996-97; see also MYTHS AND FACTS, supra
note 17.
150 See Maiano, supra note 117, at 997.
m See Duwe & Goldman, supra note 128; supra Part III.A.2.
152 See McKune, 536 U.S. at 34-35.
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meaningful participation in their treatment programs.13 Finally,
while there is sentiment to the contrary, because there is a
reasonable basis to conclude that these incentives may be useful
components of a treatment plan, courts should not attempt to
resolve a clinical and penological debate that is beyond their
competence. 154
b. Prisoner's Interest in Early Release
A court would be unlikely to find Hirsch's liberty interest in
early release to be weighty: "There is no constitutional or
inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released
before the expiration of a valid sentence [,]" for, "the conviction,
with all its procedural safeguards," has constitutionally
extinguished the right to freedom."' Rather, for an inmate to
have a protected liberty interest in release prior to completing his
constitutionally imposed sentence, "he must have a legitimate
expectancy of release that is grounded in the state's statutory
scheme."'"' For example, because of the contours of its
sentencing system, which creates a presumption that with good
behavior inmates will be released after serving two-thirds of
their sentence, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has determined
that Minnesota inmates have a liberty interest in parole. 5 7
In New York, on the other hand, the parole board determines
prisoners' fates according to guidelines established by the parole
board itself, guidelines that delegate wide latitude to the board's
case-by-case discretion.'5 8 As a result, inmates in New York have
been held to "have no liberty interest in parole. . . ."1' Under
such a system, losing parole is not a penalty, but merely the
'" See id. at 47-48; Duwe & Goldman, supra note 128.
15 See McKune, 536 U.S. at 34-35; supra Part III.A.2.
15 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979).
15 Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 170 (2d Cir. 2001).
15' See Johnson v. Fabian, 735 N.W.2d 295, 302, 308-09 (Minn. 2007).
15' See Barna, 239 F.3d at 171 (detailing the procedures for making parole
determinations in New York).
" Id. This is probably an overstatement. See Boddie v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 288
F. Supp. 2d 431, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (prisoner's liberty interest in discretionary
release is limited to having his case considered according to statutorily mandated
criteria, and not being denied parole for arbitrary or impermissible reasons-for
example, race).
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state's withholding a benefit that it is under no obligation to
give.160 Thus, a court would not be likely to give Hirsch's liberty
interest in retaining his good-time much weight.
c. Voluntariness and Directness
The state's interest in rehabilitation and community
protection and Hirsch's liberty interest in early release, balanced
with the other two factors-voluntariness and directness-would
likely result in a determination that Hirsch's constitutional
rights were not violated when he lost good-time credits as the
eventual consequence of not making the required admissions in
SOCP. Hirsch's participation was not ordered by any court or
executive body; rather, SOCP was a voluntary program that he
was at liberty to refuse without directly incurring sanctions for
violating a court order. And the denial of good time credits was
not automatic in the manner contemplated by decisions like
Ainsworth.' In fact, only after reviewing Hirsch's entire record
and giving him the opportunity to be heard did the Committee
determine that he had "not earnled] his good time."162
2. Harmonizing the Split
In addition to providing some guidance to lower courts
determining the constitutionality of sex offender treatment
programs in the wake of McKune, this four-factor approach
brings the added benefit of reconciling the seemingly divergent
outcomes discussed in Part II above. Under this analysis, it may
be that the liberty interests implicated in the various cases were
actually distinguishable. In Searcy and Ainsworth, for example,
each court noted that its state's statutory scheme did not create a
liberty interest in parole.'6 3  On the contrary, in Johnson v.
160 See Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2002).
161 See Ainsworth v. Stanley, 317 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[T]he denial of parole
was not entirely automatic. While the vast majority of parolees had completed the
[program] prior to release, a few inmates are paroled each year despite having not
completed [it]."); Defoy v. McCullough, 301 F. App'x 177, 182 n.9 (3d Cir. 2008) ("In
McKune, the defendant was denied his privileges as a direct result of his choice;
here, [plaintiff] was at least considered for reparole.").
162 Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 32.
163 See Searcy, 299 F.3d at 1226 (noting that state regulations left the award of
good-time credits entirely to the discretion of penal authorities and made no
guarantee of reward for satisfactory behavior); Ainsworth, 317 F.3d at 5 (observing
that not earning parole as a consequence of plaintiffs non-participation in
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Fabian, the court specifically noted, "The discretionary reward
systems at issue in Ainsworth and Searcy were significantly
different than the mandatory Minnesota system on which we
base[ I our conclusion... ."'I In such a circumstance, delaying
early release amounts to an "extension of the inmates'
incarceration time,"16s not merely the withholding of a
discretionary benefit.' 6 Likewise, in Antelope, the Ninth Circuit
characterized the cascading series of punishments imposed as a
result of the defendant's refusal to make potentially self-
incriminating admissions in treatment as his being "sentenced to
a longer prison term."' Where an offender's sentence becomes
longer as a result of his refusal to make self-incriminating
statements, as opposed to merely becoming not shorter, a
weightier liberty interest is implicated. Moreover, the Defendant
in Antelope was initially sentenced to probation that was then
revoked,'6 8 and courts have noted that revocation of probation
implicates weightier liberty interests than mere denial of
parole. 169
The other two factors of voluntariness and directness of
consequences-from Johnson and Antelope-also weigh more
heavily against the state's interest in the prevention of
recidivism than they do in Searcy and Ainsworth. For example,
in Johnson, the treatment program was not voluntary because
the petitioners were actually ordered to participate in it.170
Likewise, in Antelope, the treatment was included in the
probation terms mandated by the trial court.'' Moreover, in
neither case was the refusal to make self-incriminating
admissions and subsequent disqualification from treatment
counseling was not "a new or additional penalty" but merely the withholding of a
discretionary benefit that the state was entitled to condition on participation in
therapy).
16 735 N.W.2d 295, 308 (Minn. 2007); see supra note 96.
165 Johnson, 735 N.W.2d at 309.
166 See supra text accompanying note 96.
117 United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added).
16 See id. at 1131-32.
169 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
10 (1979) (describing revocation of probation and the denial of parole as "losing what
one has" versus "not getting what one wants," and noting the "human difference"
between the two).
170 See Johnson, 735 N.W.2d at 298.
17 See Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1131.
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merely one factor considered among others in determining
whether to grant early release or not to revoke probation; rather,
in Johnson the delay of early release was imposed as a direct
sanction for refusing treatment, 1 72 and in Antelope the trial court
revoked defendant's probation solely because he was not
complying with his court-ordered treatment. 7 3
D. The Atypical and Significant Hardship Test: A More Honest
Approach
Thus, under the four-factor approach implied in Searcy and
Ainsworth, the divergent outcomes reached by the various courts
to consider this issue can actually be distinguished and
harmonized under a coherent legal standard. Nevertheless, this
approach is flawed. First, in determining the extent to which a
state's statutory scheme grants a protected liberty interest in
early release, the test relies on undesirable searching of statutory
language for evidence of discretion or mandate-for example, use
of the word "shall."7  This process leads to torturing statutory
language, and actually creates an incentive for states, rather
than creating rigid, objective guidelines for granting or denying
parole, to leave the widest discretion to parole authorities to
make decisions on an ad hoc basis, a system with obvious
potential to do greater harm to prisoners' interests than a system
with a pre-determined set of decisive, reviewable factors.7
Second, the approach relies on specious distinctions between
penalizing inmates and withholding a benefit from them. It may
be true that, based on a bare schematic of sentencing and parole
mechanisms, Minnesota's system creates a more legitimate
1I See 735 N.W.2d at 298.
173 See 395 F.3d at 1131.
171 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480-81 (1995) (criticizing the method of
"wrestl[ing] with the language of intricate, often rather routine prison guidelines to
determine whether mandatory language and substantive predicates created an
enforceable expectation that the State would produce a particular outcome with
respect to the prisoner's . . . confinement").
17. See id. at 481 ("By shifting the focus of the liberty interest inquiry to one
based on the language of a particular regulation, and not the nature of the
deprivation, the Court encouraged prisoners to comb regulations in search of
mandatory language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred
privileges.").
.76 See id. at 482.
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expectancy of release than, say, New Hampshire's."' But it is
difficult to imagine that the prospect of losing parole would not
be equally disturbing to an inmate in either state; and it is
likewise unlikely that inmates in Minnesota fear a postponement
of parole by forty-five days more than Joseph Hirsch feared
postponement of his by ten-and-a-half months.7 8 While these
distinctions may be helpful in certain contexts, in the self-
incrimination sphere the question is whether the consequences
for remaining silent are sufficient to overcome the prisoner's will
not to speak.7 9 The emotional impact of an impending loss of
early release should certainly play into that determination.
Third, the four-factor approach relies on similarly specious
distinctions between voluntariness and involuntariness and
directness and indirectness. The essential question in the
penalty cases is whether the alleged compulsion was enough to
overcome the witness's free will not to speak. 8 0 So, because the
compulsion inquiry seeks to determine whether statements were
rendered involuntary by the imposition of a threat or penalty,
simply to say that participation in a program was voluntary
because it was not ordered by an administrator or court is to
sidestep the inquiry into the penalty altogether.' 8' Furthermore,
courts' determinations of what is a direct or indirect consequence
seem frequently to split hairs. For example, in Ainsworth, the
court determined that prisoners' loss of parole was not direct
because, even though ninety-seven percent of parolees had
completed the treatment program, it was at least possible to be
paroled without completing treatment.'8 2 But it is hard to credit
this determination when such an overwhelming majority of sex
"' See Ainsworth v. Stanley, 317 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002); Johnson, 735 N.W.2d
at 302, 308-09; supra note 96.
"1 See Johnson, 735 N.W.2d at 298-99; Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 5.
New York's early release system has been deemed discretionary, not mandatory. See
Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001).
17 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 48-49 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964).
181 See supra text accompanying notes 161-162.
182 See Ainsworth, 317 F.3d at 3 ("While the vast majority of parolees had
completed the SOP prior to release, a few inmates are paroled each year despite
having not completed the SOP.").
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offenders who received parole had completed treatment while
merely three percent had not.18 3  Such a consequence is only
indirect in the most technical sense.
E. The Atypical and Significant Hardship Test: In Practice
The atypical and significant hardship standard avoids these
problems. In applying it, the correct approach is not the
Minnesota Supreme Court's, but the McKune plurality's. The
court in Johnson v. Fabian determined that the inmates' loss of
early release was an atypical and significant hardship because
Minnesota's sentencing scheme made early release mandatory
rather than discretionary. 8 4 As discussed above, this approach,
especially for federal courts considering the constitutionality of a
state's prison regulation, is inappropriate. 8 5 A more appropriate
and manageable approach is that of the plurality in McKune,
which reasoned that for "the consequences of an inmate's choice
to remain silent" to be such an atypical and significant hardship,
they must be "closer to the physical torture against which the
[self-incrimination privilege] clearly protects" rather than "the de
minimis harms against which it does not."186
Few-or none-of these programs come close to such torture.
For example, the McKune plurality noted that not only had
Kansas never prosecuted an inmate on the basis of admissions in
counseling, but the program at issue had never even disclosed
information gathered during counseling to authorities.'" In fact,
in this author's research, he uncovered no instance of any state's
having prosecuted an individual on the basis of information
obtained during sex-offender counseling. Thus, there is no
indication that these programs are elaborate information-
gathering operations; rather, they are therapeutic, designed for
the benefit of the community and-because states could simply
opt not to rehabilitate offenders but instead imprison them for
ever-longer terms-ultimately inure to the benefit of the offender
by increasing society's amenability to his release. 8 8  These
... See id. at 3.
1" See Johnson v. Fabian, 735 N.W.2d 295, 302, 308-09 (Minn. 2007).
185 See supra text accompanying notes 179-181.
186 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002).
17 Id. at 30, 35.
18s See id. at 47-48.
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attributes are a far cry from the kinds of penalties against which
the privilege was originally developed. Physical torture, forcing a
defendant to take an oath and subjecting her to an inquisition
regarding charges of which she is unaware, jailing an otherwise
free witness for contempt to compel him to testify: These are
examples of "imposing penalties for the refusal to incriminate
oneself that go beyond the criminal process and appear, starkly,
as government attempts to compel testimony .. . ."8
In this light, it is unlikely that the consequences Hirsch
faced were atypical and significant hardships in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life. Hirsch's sentence was not
extended like the offender's in Antelope. 90 Rather, Hirsch merely
served out the remainder of his legitimately imposed sentence.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that DOCS, despite
maintaining the possibility of punishment, actively cooperated
with prosecutors to pass on information obtained in counseling.'9'
Furthermore, Hirsch could not have been surprised by losing
early release because of his unwillingness to admit responsibility
for his offenses of conviction because it is established practice to
mitigate sentences on the basis of remorse, or to tie parole
determinations to accepting responsibility for one's actions.' 92
The Time Allowance Committee determined that Hirsch lacked
remorse on the basis of his expulsion from treatment; that it
should have done so on this basis rather than on the basis of
statements made in a parole hearing seems immaterial.193 These
circumstances combine to render Hirsch's loss of early release not
an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, courts have grappled with sex-offender
counseling programs that offer incentives to participate, require
participants to admit responsibility for their misconduct, and do
not immunize such admissions. While McKune addressed the
" Id. at 53 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190 See United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005).
191 That is, there is no evidence that SOCP was a ruse for illegitimately
obtaining evidence for criminal prosecutions. See McKune, 536 U.S. at 48.
12 See id. at 47.
' See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 32.
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loss of privileges, many of these programs go farther-and
inmates who refuse to participate can find themselves
incarcerated for longer periods. While the McKune plurality
ruled that a mere loss of privileges was not compulsion in
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the Court has never ruled on whether states may
actually confine an inmate longer as a consequence of not making
admissions in counseling. Blanket arguments against these
programs, which attack their constitutional analysis or
psychological validity, are unsatisfactory. An efficient and
practical approach to these programs considers whether
participants are actually being asked to incriminate themselves;
but this approach does not dispose of every constitutional
violation that could arise from such counseling. Courts that have
considered these programs have measured largely the same
factors and, while they have reached different outcomes, when
analyzed in light of these factors, their outcomes can be
harmonized. Ultimately, however, consideration of these four
factors is flawed. The best approach, which can dispose of every
case of longer confinement as a result of non-participation in
counseling-unlike the incrimination test-and which avoids
unseemly judicial meddling-as occurs under the four-factor
inquiry-is that recommended by the McKune plurality: A
consequence of non-participation is compulsion in violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination if it constitutes an atypical
and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.
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